Caught between the ideology and realities of development:  
















“Caught between the ideology and realities of development:  










                                               
*
 John R. Campbell in Senior Lecturer in the Anthropology of Development at the Department of Anthropology and Sociology, 




MIGRATION STUDIES UNIT 






Migration Studies Unit Working Papers No. 2009/01 
This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only from LSE 
Migration Studies Unit Working Papers at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/MSU/working-papers.html. 
Any additional reproduction for other purposes, whether in hard copy or 
electronically, requires the consent of the author(s) and editor(s). If cited or quoted, 
reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
working paper or other series, the year, and the publisher. 
 
The author(s) or editor(s) should inform the Migration Studies Unit at the LSE if the 







© 2009 John R. Campbell 
 
 
Migration Studies Unit 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 






Caught between the ideology and realities of development:  






Caught between the ideology and realities of development:  
Transiting from the Horn of Africa to Europe 
 
 
John R Campbell* 
School of Oriental and African Studies, London 
 
Abstract 
While the teloi of development seeks to explicitly link an ideology of ‘market fundamentalism’ 
to one of ‘rights-based development’, the reality of life for many in developing societies is 
characterized by growing inequality and despotic rule. In such situations many people leave in 
search of a better life or protection from persecution. This paper examines the hemorrhaging of 
people from Ethiopia and Eritrea and the obstacles they encounter as they cross international 
borders. It also examines the long term consequences which this population movement has for  
development in the Horn where, in the face of declining official aid flows, remittances from the 
Diaspora are likely to become increasingly important.  
 
 
This paper examines the nature and consequences of large-scale migration from Eritrea and 
Ethiopia. What factors lie behind the flow of immigrants that have been leaving the Horn of Africa 
over the past 30+ years? What confronts these individuals as they transit Africa and the Middle East 
to Europe? I shall refer to these individuals as sojourners purposely eliding the term refugee with 
that of migrant because I wish to stress their journey and what happens to them on that journey. 
Once in exile these individuals are periodically forced to settle (albeit temporarily) and move in  
complicated transit that may take days, months or years to complete.  
 
Section (i) sets out my approach to migration. While nearly all the literature on the Horn of Africa 
focuses on ‘refugees’ this misdirects attention away from the actual processes of migration and the 
role played by the nation-state. A focus on migration also fails to consider the longer term impact 
which high levels of migration is likely to have for development in the migrants’ country of origin. 
                                               
*
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Section (ii) examines the political situation in Ethiopia and Eritrea and sets out the context against 
which high levels of migration have occurred. Section (iii) looks at the population hemorrhage and 
the experience of migrant’s transiting the continent. Section (iv) briefly examines the relationship 
between migrants and the governments in their country of origin. I conclude by arguing that only 
markedly different political conditions in the Horn will stem the flow of migration. I also speculate 
about the possible trajectory of development for Ethiopia and Eritrea given the decline in official 
aid flows and the likelihood that future overseas investment is likely to depend increasingly on 
remittances/investment from their Diaspora communities.  
 
i. Migration from the Horn – voluntary or forced? 
 
As David Turton has reminded us, initial efforts to conceptualize and explain migration became 
mired in a sterile debate: did people leave their countries voluntarily or were they forced out 
(2003)? He argues that the tendency in migration research has been to adopt policy related 
categories and concerns which hinder academic research and policy analysis by focusing on the 
‘motives’ of migrants rather than on the way a nation exercises its power in relation to a diverse 
range of ‘ethnic others’.  
 
Turton argues that the dichotomy voluntary v. forced is too simplistic to grasp the complex factors 
driving migration. Furthermore, and as Papadopolou has noted of transit migration, ‘… the 
intention [of the migrant, jc] is not always clear at the beginning of the journey, but is usually 
affected by the structural context of the first country of reception’ and by ‘the nature, operation and 
inter-relations of migrant social networks’ (2005: 4). Nevertheless European/northern governments 
have embraced the dichotomy to justify policies intended to prevent the entry of unwanted 
‘economic migrants’ and ‘bogus asylum seekers’. Europe perceives immigrants, and in particular 
‘black’ immigrants, as a problem: they are a threat to national ‘integration’ and an unwarranted 
drain on resources (i.e. welfare services, education and housing).  
 
European nations have attempted to control entry by imposing border controls, but such attempts 
have proved ineffective. In the UK and elsewhere such policies have been superseded by ‘liberal’ 
policies aimed at managing the entry of desirable migrants (Flynn 2005) and through EU initiatives 
preventing the entry of unwanted migrants and asylum seekers (Geddes 2003). Indeed the EU has 
‘externalised’ its immigration controls via special agreements with states in North Africa and 
Eastern Europe (Boswell 2003) creating a situation that has significantly redefined the rights of 
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resident immigrants (who are subjected to harsh and discriminatory treatment) while militarizing 
EU borders to deter migrants (and asylum seekers) from entering.   
 
Is immigration a problem in Europe? The evidence is not clear and the answer depends on one’s 
perspective. 
 
Table A. Foreign-born population, Selected OECD Countries 








Austria nil nil nil 12.5 (2001) 
Belgium 8.9 9.1 8.8 8.3 (2004) 
Canada 16.7  (1991) 17.8 (1996) nil 18.1 (2001) 
Denmark 3.5 4.3 nil 18.8 (2001) 
France 6.3 nil nil 5.6 (1999) 
Germany 8.4 8.8 8.9 8.8 (2005) 
Ireland 6.1 (1991) 7.0 (1996) - 10.4 (2003) 
Netherlands nil 8.2 9.0 10.6 (2003) 
Norway  233 292 361 
Sweden 9.2 10.6 113 11.8 (2003) 
UK 3.2 3.4 4.2 5.2 (2005) 
 
Table A indicates that the percentage of foreign-born population varies immensely across Europe 
and we are left to conclude that statistics alone do not provide a definitive answer even though 
governments and the media consistently discuss immigration as in ‘crisis’. This paper is not 
concerned with the effectiveness of such policies, instead it looks at the impact which EU 
immigration policies have for the development of immigrant’s home countries.  
 
There is little empirical research that sheds light on this issue. Newland (2004) and more recently 
Portesii have argued that two key factors are at work. First they note that Diaspora communities 
have very different relations to their countries of origin, a relation that partly reflects the nature of 
outward migration, i.e. whether migration is circular or one way and whether migration is of 
unskilled labor or of professionals. The second critical factor concerns the policies pursued by their 




home government (towards their Diaspora and in creating conditions for development) and of the 
government where they currently reside (e.g. in recognizing the contribution and rights as 
immigrants). These factors determine the Diaspora’s willingness to remit and/or invest in their 
country of origin and the likelihood that they will return ‘home’.  
 
Portes argues that to the extent that a developing country has the infrastructure to produce 
professionals whose skills are in demand internationally, their nationals are able to legally migrate 
to developed countries where they earn good salaries, develop professional skills and remit money 
home. Professionals are best placed to remit and invest back home if the infrastructure there permits 
it. Unskilled migrants, on the other hand, enter developed countries illegally. As such they are 
subject to deportation and, because of their lack of skills, obtain irregular and poorly paid work. 
Furthermore they are increasingly unable to leave their host country due to immigration controls. In 
short illegal immigrants are unable to remit/invest in their homelands which may reinforce a process 
of one-way migration out that depopulates their homeland. 
  
Long term migration clearly raises complex issues about the current and future situation of migrants 
and their countries of origin. After examining the history and nature of migration in the Horn I will 
conclude by addressing two key issues with respect to Ethiopia and Eritrea. First what is the relation 
between migrants and their country of origin? If their governments are hostile or indifferent to them 
how does this affect their willingness return and/or to remit/invest back home? Second to what 
extent have the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments put into place policies to create an 
infrastructure that encourages and makes productive use of investments by their Diaspora?  
 
ii. Problems in the Horn: The failure of political leadership 
Ethiopia and Eritrea have a long and entangled relationship. The province of Eritrea was seized 
from Ethiopian by the Italians in the late 19th century. Following the end of world war II Eritrea was 
briefly administered by the United Kingdom until 1952 following a United Nations Referendum 
when Emperor Haile Selassie  of Ethiopia assumed control of Eritrea. Following an abortive army 
mutiny in the 1960s Haile Selassie was overthrown in a coup d’etat in1974 by the Derge or 
Provisional Military Council that assumed power pursued a military campaign against rebellious 
ethnic groups and the political opposition which led to wide spread persecution and terror. The 
military established extensive forms of bureaucratic governance but was unwilling to negotiate on 
issues that might dilute its power.  
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In 1989 the Derg lost control of Eritrea and Tigre to the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) 
and the Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) who formed the Ethiopian Peoples 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). In May 1991, following the end of Russian military 
support to the Derge, the guerillas entered Addis Ababa and assumed power (Gilkes 1993).  
The EPLF soon withdrew from the EPRDF to govern Eritrea leaving the TPLF as the dominant 
power in Ethiopia. The two liberation fronts transformed themselves into political parties and 
reorganized the state and the military. The EPRDF then carefully stage-managed the political 
process in Ethiopia by overseeing the creation of an interim power sharing government, drawing up 
a new national constitution, initiating national elections and concluding agreements with the EPLF 
that foreshadowed Eritrean independence in 1993 (Brietzke 1995).  
EPRDF-rule generated political dissent. In 1994 the Oromo Liberation Front and other (ethnic-
based) opposition parties withdrew from Government. Following the 1995 elections the EPRDF 
instituted a policy of regionalisation in which it’s ethnic-based fronts became major players in the 
new regional administrations. Despite the promise of decentralization greater control was exerted 
over the civil service and regional states. Decentralization left regional governments with grossly 
inadequate resources and it fuelled demands by ethnic groups for political recognition. In short 
EPRDF policies lay the basis for social and political fragmentation, a process that has been 
furthered by military/security campaigns aimed at dissidents and wide swathes of the population 
who allegedly support banned political organizations. The situation has given rise to growing levels 
of political conflict, extensive human rights abuses and a constant flow of refugees. The 
government has pursued an ‘IMF-style’ policy framework intended to secure vital donor support for 
its development policies which are aimed at alleviating poverty and investing in agriculture-led 
industrialization (Economist Intelligence Unit 2007). Despite its failure to achieve significant 
market reform and its brutal crackdown on the political opposition, the Government has secured 
continued donor support. 
Eritrea followed a similar trajectory. Almost its first act at independence was to deport 130,000 
‘non-Eritreans’ (i.e. people accused of complicity with the Ethiopian administration including the 
Eritrean wives and children of Ethiopian soldiers).iii In 1993 the EPLF organized a national 
referendum on independence which was universally supported throughout Eritrea and in the 
Diaspora. This was followed by a period of political consolidation in which the ruling party 
canvassed for a new constitution and promised democratic elections. Neither materialized. Instead 
the party became increasingly autocratic. In May 1998 a war erupted with Ethiopia over the 




demarcation of their shared border. The war went disastrously wrong for Eritrea which lost large 
areas of its territory and 19,000 soldiers forcing it to sue for peace. Ethiopia lost an estimated 
30,000 soldiers and at least one million people from both countries were displaced (Plaut 2004: 
117-18).  
 
During the border war the EPRDF exploited public sentiment and deported 75,000 
Eritrean’s/‘Ethiopians of Eritrean descent’. Individuals were arrested at night in their homes; 
families were split up, assets seized, and following varying periods of detention the ‘aliens’ were 
driven to the Eritrean border and forced to walk across the battle field (Byrne 2002). The Eritrean 
authorities initially assisted deportees who had to prove their eligibility for citizenship; 1-2000 
deportees were unable to do this and some were expelled. Eritrea retaliated by deporting 22,000 
‘Ethiopians’. The deportations violated both countries international legal obligations and stripped 
tens of thousands of individuals of their nationality. A ceasefire came into place in the May 2000 
followed by a UN operation to police the disputed border; international arbitration was also initiated 
to establish the border and assess war claims.iv  
 
In September 2001 the ruling People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) led by President 
Afewerki seized power and detained individuals suspected of opposing it. The private media was 
shut down. Government set aside the Constitution, postponed elections, and indefinitely extended 
military service for everyone between the ages of 18-50 (AI 2003). Eritrea became a one-party state 
that uses roadblocks and undertakes random searches (‘giffa’) to round up youth for conscription 
and to arrest deserters and draft evaders (US 2003). Shoot to kill policies have been used against 
‘deserters’(HRW 2008). Such policies have pushed citizens out of the country in growing numbers: 
70,000 people fled to Sudan between 2002 and 2006 (at a rate of 100 per day).v  
 
The authorities are ‘wedded to a discredited form of command economy’ in which the Party, 
through state firms, runs all aspects of the economy (Chatham House 2007). The effect of such 
policies, taken together with the fact that a large percentage of the productive population are 
conscripted, has resulted in low economic growth, rising inflation, rising debt and the collapse of 
the private sector. Officially economic policy is autarkic and very little official aid enters the 
country. By the end of 2007 Eritrea’s refusal to cooperate with the UN meant that UNMEE 
operations on the Eritrea-Ethiopia border were sharply curtailed.vi Tensions on the border are high 
in part because Eritrean armed forces remain on alert and have entered the disputed border. 
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iii. Conflict, drought and population displacement 
 
The initial impetus for population movement out of Ethiopia and Eritrea in the mid-19th century was 
to escape drought particularly in the mountainous central highlands. Displacement tended to be 
towards the lowlands but there was also limited migration into The Sudan (Kibreab 1996: 135) and 
eastwards into Somalia and Djibouti (Ingrams & Pankhurst 2006). Some of these immigrants did 
not return. In subsequent years these early migrants were to play a significant role in providing 
shelter, food and assistance to those who followed. Population movements from the late-19th 
century onwards have been characterized by the rapid movement of large numbers of people 
seeking temporary refuge from famine, drought and war. While most refugees eventually return 
home, increasing numbers have, since the late 1960s, embarked on a transcontinental journey away 
from The Horn.  
 
Thus in early 1967 about 60,000 ‘Ethiopians’ resided in Sudan because of civil war in Eritrea. 
However by mid-1967 conflict between liberation fronts in Tigre and Eritrea and the Ethiopia 
armed forces displaced a further 26,000 refugees into Sudan. Successive waves of refugees were to 
follow the 1974 coup against Haile Sellasie (Smock 1982).  
 
During the 1983/4 famine 190,000 people were displaced from Tigre (Northern Ethiopia) into The 
Sudan though most returned voluntarily (Bariagaber 1999: 610). However thousands more were to 
arrive following their escape from resettlement schemes in southern Ethiopia where the 
Government had forcibly moved 600,000 people (Clay & Holcomb 1985; Gebre 2002). In 1980 
there were 390,000 Eritreans and Ethiopians in Sudan; by 1994 there were 850,000. Between 1984 
and 1991 approximately 33,195 of these refugees were resettled in the US and about 11,060 in 
Canada (Woldemikael 1998; Matsuoka & Sorenson 2001: 60). 
 
Refugees in Sudan received limited humanitarian assistance which led many to move to small 
regional towns or to Khartoum where they worked and lived illegally (and/or relied on remittances 
from relatives; Kuhlman 1994: chap. 8; Smock 1982; Weaver 1985; Kibreab 1996). In 1994 an 
estimated that 40,000 erstwhile refugees were living illegally in Khartoum, by 2001 the number had 
increased to 237,000 (UNHCR 2001). The authorities made life difficult for refugees by refusing to 
countenance self-settlement and by imposing restrictions on their movement, on employment and 
on access to services. Indeed throughout the 1980s and 1990s the authorities refouled and/or 
arrested refugees.  





People were also being displaced in the Ogaden in eastern Ethiopia (Ofcansky & Berry 1993: 89-
90). Following the 1977/78 war between Ethiopia and Somalia 700,000 Ethiopians sheltered in 
refuge camps in Somalia. While most eventually returned a new wave of refugees was created by 
the 1983/84 famine and by forced villagization which pushed 30,000 Ethiopians into Somalia. By 
the late 1980s the UN estimated that 450-620,000 Ethiopians were in Somalia. In 2000 and 2003, 
according to UNHCR estimates, there were 121,096 and 22,276 Ethiopians sheltering in Somalia, 
respectively (2003).  
 
The 1977/78 Ogaden war and drought displaced a further 42,000 people into Djibouti (Crisp 1984). 
However Ethiopian pressure on Djibouti forced the refoulement of a small number of individuals 
and the eventual repatriation of 7,000 people by late 1983. Subsequently others were refouled 
though most voluntarily returned. While the 1983/4 famine pushed 10,000 people back into 
Djibouti numbers dwindled to about 3,000 by 2005.vii   
 
Since at least 1991 Ethiopians have been crossing the Gulf of Aden to Yemen. Though the route is 
well establishedviii refugees are subjected to considerable violence and the Somali government 
refouled Ethiopians.ix Refugees rely on smugglers to ferry them from Bosaso to Aden at a cost of 
US$50-70.00 per head.x Thousands have died at the hands of ‘pirates’ and traffickers who have 
murdered, robbed and forced refugees into the sea to avoid being caught by Yemeni patrols.xi It is 
estimated that 25,000 (most of whom are Somali) people attempt the journey every year, but on 
arrival they confront poor conditions in Yemeni refugee camps.xii  
 
Insight into the processes behind Ethiopians transiting this route comes from a recent IOM mission 
to Bosaso which interviewed fifty individuals out of an estimated 5000 Ethiopians at the port (Yitna 
2006). Typically individuals came from poor farming families in northeastern Ethiopia and were 
seeking work in Saudi Arabia. They financed their trip – with savings of between US$115-800.00 
per person – from savings, sale of property and loans. Nearly all traveled with the support of their 
families. The journey was punctuated by numerous stops. At each stage sojourners paid a ‘broker’ 
from their own ethnic groups, and each stage had to be negotiated and paid for separately. While the 
smuggling networks were well organized, there was little evidence of trafficking. In 2006 it was 
estimated that 10,000 Ethiopians were legally registered in Yemen and that 500 Ethiopians sought 
to enter Yemen weekly on route to Saudi Arabia (Terrazas 2007: 12). Once in Yemen the hope was 
to move on to Saudi Arabia where an estimated 40,000 Eritreans reside (the Saudi Authorities 
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recently built a wall to close off this route; US 2003).The Saudi’s are not hospitable to African 
sojourners who end up working illegally unless they are attached to recognized political parties.xiii  
 
Ethiopians and Eritreans in Saudi Arabia – the latter having crossed the Red Sea – transit Northern 
Syria and enter Turkey illegally. Brewer & Yukseker report that while these migrants seek to avoid 
the Turkish police nevertheless 622 were arrested between 1995 and 2005 (2005/6: 71). Though 
they constitute a small proportion of the migrants/asylum seekers in Istanbul, their numbers – which 
include single women and some families – are increasing. Seventy seven percent of Ethiopians went 
to Turkey because friends were there, compared to 28% of Eritreans. They share a derelict room 
with co-ethnics or co-religionists but are isolated from other migrants and Turkish society (p. 40, 
77). Living conditions are poor: there is little support/charity available and most rely on jobs in the 
informal sector (though 11% of Ethiopians receive help from their families). Most seek to enter 
Europe via Greece. Because they are constantly on the move they appear to be a very transient 
group.    
 
A third route for refugees has been to move south. As the statistics in Appendix I indicate there was 
a massive flow of Ethiopian civilians and soldiers to Kenya in 1991 when the Derge collapsed. 
While many of those individuals returned, there has been a constant flow of ethnic-Oromo people, 
political refugees, journalists, academics and professionals. Refugee numbers spiked in late 2005 
and early 2006 following the EPRDF’s crackdown on opposition political parties after the 2005 
elections.xiv  
 
The Kenyan government views refugees as a security problem and has failed to enact refugee 
legislation. During the 1990s the authorities turned a blind eye as Ethiopian agents abducted, 
harassed and killed resident Ethiopians. This coincided with police harassment of refugees who 
were detained to extort bribes (HRW 2002). Refugees in UNHCR camps in northern Kenya were 
also subjected to extensive violence causing many to flee into the towns (Crisp 2000) where they 
were forced to bribe UNHCR staff in Nairobi to have their refugee applications processed.xv 
 
From about 2000 when the Eritrea-Ethiopia border war ended a trickle of Eritrean youth escaping 
conscription have sought refuge in Ethiopia where they have been placed in refugee camps (see 
Appendix I).xvi A small number of them have been allowed to apply for resettlement to the US.  
 




Over the past 35 years an untold number of Ethiopians and Eritreans have left their homes seeking 
refuge. On the basis of official estimates between 1996 and 2006 (but excluding 2003 and 2004 for 
which the figures are incomplete) an estimated 3.14 million individuals were registered as refugees 
in The Horn or in Kenya (see Appendix I). Official figures are an underestimate, but in any event a 
minimum of 349,000 individuals were living as refugees outside Ethiopia and Eritrea each year. 
There are no reliable statistics indicating how many of these people continued to reside elsewhere in 
the Horn nor is there reliable information about how many left the Horn.  
 
Sudan hosted the majority of the refugees. With the success of the EPLF in the late 1980s it became 
possible for some to return home. Following independence in 1993 about 130,000 returned 
voluntarily. However as late as 2005 an estimated 116,000 remained and, as supporters of banned 
opposition political parties, they applied for refugee status (Bascom 2005: 167; Rake 2007: 437). 
There were many reasons why Eritreans were/are unwilling to return. Many believed that their land 
and homes had been occupied by others and many were integrated into Sudanese society. 
Furthermore economic conditions in Eritrea during the mid-90s were poor; severe drought 
undermined agricultural production and 70 percent of the population depended on food aid.xvii  
 
In 1999 UNHCRs invoked the cessation clause for Ethiopian refugees, this was followed by a 
further invocation in 2002 for Eritrean refugees. This meant that from the date of invocation 
Ethiopians and Eritreans who fled the country prior to 1991 ‘no longer had a well founded fear of 
persecution’ and could now lawfully be returned to their country of origin.xviii Those who remained 
faced a stark choice: they could stay illegally – in which case they might be arrested or forcibly 
returnedxix –or they could move on.   Rather than remain illegally and without the possibility of 
being resettled, many traveled to Cairo where they arrived in four ‘waves’: in 1978/9 (to escape the 
‘red terror’); between 1984-88 (to escape conscription); in the early 1990s (when the Derge fell); 
and following the 1998-2000 border war (Cooper 1992: table 1.6, p.13; Zohry & Harrel-Bond 2003: 
57-8).  
 
The experience of Taddele (1991) who fled Ethiopia in 1983 for Sudan and who went on to 
Khartoum and Cairo illustrates the situation that many individuals found themselves in. A minor 
government official accused of belonging to a banned party, Taddele walked for 13 days to reach 
the border where he contracted malaria. It took another 3 days to reach a town where he and his 
cousin were jailed. On  release he made his way to Gedaref where he registered as a refugee and 
worked for several months. He then traveled to Khartoum, worked to accumulate money and, with 
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information provided by an Ethiopian who had been deported from Egypt, planned his journey to 
Cairo. He joined a small group of Eritreans he met on the train from Khartoum to the Egyptian 
border; the party got lost in the desert before stumbling into fishermen on the Nile who fed, 
sheltered and helped them reach Aswan where they boarded a train to Cairo and sheltered in a 
Christian church.  
 
The ‘Ethiopians’ population in Cairo is in constant flux because those whose claims are not 
recognized by UNHCR, and most are not, move on (Cooper 1992: 17). No one settles in Cairo. 
‘Ethiopians’ live in small apartments dispersed across the city, often with others of the same 
ethnicity. Cooper describes them as forming ‘mini-communities’ whose day-to-day lives consist of 
going to the UNHCR office and attending Protestant churches or NGOs in search of support (1992: 
25; Brown, Riordan & Sharpe 2004). In the early nineties they were typically single men in their 
mid-twenties. Most had completed secondary school, had come from towns and had middle class 
backgrounds (Cooper 1992:17). While 19% had arrived on a direct flight to Cairo, over half had 
spent two or more years in Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia or Saudi Arabia. They are in every sense long 
term sojourners constantly on the move. 
 
Here as in Khartoum and the Middle East they confront discrimination and racism and are forced to 
live and work illegally. Even with valid ID they were/are frequently harassed and arrested by the 
authorities or blackmailed by ordinary Egyptians. An unknown number are detained before being 
deported (to the Sudanese border or just dumped in the desert); some deportees manage to return. In 
1992 there were perhaps 1,000 in Cairo, by 2002 the number had risen to 5,000.   
 
Those currently resident in Cairo include single women, families, Eritreans and an unknown 
number of individuals who were deported and/or stripped of their nationality by Eritrea and/or 
Ethiopia during the border war (Thomas 2006). Refused recognition by UNHCR, they live in 
poverty and without access to medical or social services; they are dependent on support provided by 
Protestant Churches. Neither the Eritrean nor the Ethiopian embassy will assist the so called 
‘mixed-nationals’ because they ‘have no place’ back home (p.19). Such actions violate international 
law. xx Given their situation it is not surprising that individuals move on quickly. Thus in early 2007 
some 600 to 2000 ‘Eritreans’ crossed illegally into Israel from Egypt. Their arrival prompted the 
Eritrean ambassador to demand their deportation as military deserters.xxi  Disturbingly in August 
2008 the Israeli military secretly deported ninety individuals – including many Eritreans –  back to 
Egypt without assessing their claims to asylum.xxii 





In the early 1990s many individuals traveled from Khartoum, using smugglers, west across the 
Sahara to Libya which has been an important destination for hundreds of thousands of African 
migrants. The journey to Kufra, an oasis just inside Libya, takes six days by truck;xxiii many do not 
survive the trip (Fortress Europe 2007). Migrants pay to be taken to Tripoli, but nearly all are forced 
out at Kufra where they are detained by the authorities before being allowed to move on (Hamood 
2006:31; and footnote 23).  
 
Following the 1992 UN air and arms embargo Libya encouraged labor migration from West Africa 
and The Horn (Hamood 2006, forthcoming; de Hass 2006). However changes in the Libyan 
economy and growing resentment against foreigners resulted in an anti-immigrant backlash and the 
adoption of repressive measures against foreigners. As early as 1994 about 1000 
Eritreans/Ethiopians were detained and repatriated. By May 2007 approximately 60,000 Africans 
were held in detention centers and prisons across Libya; reports suggest that 3-600 Eritreans 
(including women and children) were held in 2006 (Amnesty International 2006; Fortress Europe 
2007: 6). Between 2003 and early 2007 – a period of political rapprochement with Europe –Libya 
deported 258,000 ‘irregular immigrants’. Detainees were/are routinely subjected to beatings and 
abuse. Once in detention they have four options: (1) bribe their way out; (2) those unable to pay are 
taken to a detention centre in the south where, on threat of expulsion they pay to be released; failing 
which (3) they are either kept hostage (and their families overseas pay a ransom for their release); 
or (4) they are deported by plane to their country of origin or dumped in the desert (Fortress Europe 
2007: 5). Between 1998 and 2003 approximately 14,000 people were dumped in the desert where 
many must have died (ibid: 4).  
 
Those deported by air may face problems on return. Thus in 2004 two plane loads of Eritreans were 
deported. Nearly all the one hundred persons on the first flight were detained, beaten, interrogated 
and imprisoned on arrival in Asmara.xxiv The second flight, containing 60 persons, was hijacked 
over Sudan and forced to land in Khartoum where many were granted asylum.xxv  
 
Libya has not instituted an immigration policy nor is there an asylum procedure (Baldwin-Edwards 
2006: 10). Furthermore Libya is not a signatory to the Geneva Convention and it does not recognize 
the UNHCR. However it has entered into bilateral agreements with Italy and other EU countries to 
accept returned migrants who are subsequently deported to their country of origin. Despite the lack 
of protection for refugees and migrants the EU is establishing external border controls there aimed 
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at preventing the illegal entry of Africans into Europe. EU cooperation with Libya has continued 
despite the latter’s arrest and detention of thousands of migrants. Libya has made no attempt to 
regulate the abuse suffered by detainees and in effect it protects smuggling operations worth an 
estimated 100 million Euro pa (Fortress Europe 2007: 7).  
 
Libya is the principle staging post used by irregular migrants to enter southern Europe. Though the 
number of migrants arriving in Italy via Libya was down by a fifth in early 2007 (to 12,753), 
nevertheless 21,400 migrants landed in Sicily in 2006 (this included 2,500 Eritreans who were the 
third largest group and who constituted 12 percent of all arrivals and 20% of all asylum 
applications; Fortress Europe 2007: 8). The number of migrants who died crossing the 
Mediterranean between 1997 and 2007 is estimated at 10,000; in the first nine months of 2007 a 
further 502 died.xxvi  
 
As Table B shows the Italian authorities have sought to intercept migrants at sea:  
 




Table B. Intercepts along the Italian coast, 1998 to 2004 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Apulia 39,065 46,481 18,990   8,546   3,111      117       18 
Calabria 
 8,828   1,545   5,945   6,093   1,687      177        23 
Sicily 
    848   1,973   2,782   5,504  10,151 14,017 13,494 
Total 38,159 49,999 26,817 20,143 23,719 14,331 13,635 
(Source: Lutterbeck 2006: 76). 
 
Maritime interception has, however, been sharply criticized as a ‘blockade’ which has driven up the 
number of deaths among those seeking to enter (Albahari 2006).  
 
The Italians also return migrants to Libya without ascertaining their asylum claims. Thus between 
2004 and late 2006 at least 2,800 migrants were expelled via a ‘readmission’ agreement (HRW 
2006; AI 2005). Back in Libya they are detained and the cycle of extortion starts again. As a result 
of the numbers seeking to cross into Europe the size of boats has decreased thereby increasing the 
risk of drowning for subsequent migrants because smaller boats are less sea-worth and because the 
Maltese and Italian authorities are reluctant to rescue migrants from sinking boats.xxvii In any event 
increasing numbers of Libyan-based migrants are being diverted to Malta. In 2002 the Maltese 
authorities deported 223 Eritreans to Eritrea where they were arrested, detained, and held 
incommunicado (HRW 2003).xxviii In mid-2006 Malta refused to take any more migrants until EU 
member states accepted ‘their share’. In July 2006 Malta refused to allow a boatload of Eritreans to 
land until Spain, where the boat containing them was registered, accepted them.xxix In the face of 
growing numbers of illegal migrants Malta has failed to provide adequate shelter or assistance and 
it has sought a ‘readmission’ agreement with Libya.  
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If we set aside organized traffickingxxxwhich Ethiopia has done little to control, the final option is 
for an individual to fly to Europe. Tens of thousands have gone to North America and Europe on 
student visas where many overstay their visa (becoming an illegal immigrant) and others claim 
asylum (Terrazas 2007).   
Less direct routes to Europe are also used. Eritreans tend to travel overland to Sudan (because of 
official barriers to legal exit) and fly out of Khartoum; whereas Ethiopians and Somalis fly from 
Addis Ababa and Nairobi (ICMPD 2007: sec. 2.4.2). Individuals may fly indirectly (via Dubai, 
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria) or directly to Europe by arriving at one airport before transiting to a 
final destination. Organized flights for major Muslim festivals provide a major route out of the Horn 
to Saudi Arabia. Kebede (nd: 4) reports that in 2000 the Saudi authorities issued 11,000 visas for 
Ethiopians to attend Hajj; the Ethiopian authorities believe that many of those who go on Hajj stay 
and migrate elsewhere. 
Air travel is said to be the most expensive way to reach Europe, but given the absence of 
comparable information about the costs incurred on other routes this assertion must be questioned. 
While flying directly from the Horn to Europe entails a high initial cost (not to mention the fee paid 
to traffickers/agents), the cost of transiting overland suggests that financial costs are repeatedly 
incurred over a long period. The decision to fly directly from the region may reflect a different 
concern, namely the perceived risk that a child is likely to face on a long overland journey. 
Furthermore an unknown number of individuals flying into Europe are apprehended and deported.  
 
How many Eritreans and Ethiopians have entered Europe legally or illegally? The absence of an 
accurate information about immigration (legal or illegal), asylum applications or even deportations 
means that no answer can be given. Furthermore illegal entrants are likely to have been left out of 
official censuses and surveys. Writing on the Ethiopian Diaspora Terrazas’ (2007: 7) suggests that 
relatively limited numbers have reached Europe as opposed to the US, Canada and Saudi Arabia: 
 
Table C. Number of Ethiopian-born Foreign Stock by Country of Residence, 2000 




United Kingdom 8,122 France 3,715 
Sweden 11,281 Norway 3,575 
Germany 9,542 Greece 2,507 
The Netherlands 7,592 Switzerland 1,972 
Belgium 1,022 Finland 694 
United States 73,066 Canada 14,486 
  
If Terrazas’ is to be believed, the descendents of Ethiopian-born stock would significantly increase 
the total (p. 7):  
 
Table D. Distribution of Ethiopian-born stock 
USA Saudi Arabia Italy The Lebanon Israel 
460,000 90,000 30,000 30,000 105,500 
 
Figures on the number of Eritreans in Europe and North America are equally problematic. One 
study suggested that by 2000, approximately 720,000 formally registered and 350,000 illegal and 
unregistered Eritrean’s lived outside their country. (Tewolde 2005). It is not clear whether this 
estimate includes the several hundred thousand in transit across Africa and the Middle East, but it 
certainly excludes the recent exodus that has taken place since 2000. A very rough guess would be 
that between 1:4 or 1:5 of all Eritreans now live outside their country.  
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The above figures are provisional. Estimates for the UK, which are based on information provided 
by community organizations, suggests that the total number of Ethiopians and Eritreans is 30-
35,000 (Papadopolous, Lees, Lay & Gebrehiwot 2004; Rutter 2003: 14).xxxi This estimate is not in 
line with much lower official statistics on the number of individuals who have sought asylumxxxii 
which suggests that birth rates and illegal entry are contributing to the growth in numbers.  
 
The evidence on transit migration, while incomplete, presents a consistent picture of incremental 
movement out of Ethiopia/Eritrea during the 1950s to neighboring countries. By the mid-1960s the 
number of displaced ‘Ethiopians’ in Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti and Kenya sharply escalated which, 
alongside other factors in the Horn, resulted in growing numbers of displaced people embarking on 
lengthy journeys to North Africa or the Saudi peninsula. The complex factors at play make a 
mockery of simplistic assumptions about voluntary v. forced migration,  
 
In the past decade North African governments have treated African immigrants harshly – a situation 
which the EU’s militarization of the Mediterranean and the proliferation of ‘externalized’ border 
controls has reinforced. Sub-Saharan Africans face growing levels of violence, lengthy periods of 
detention and a heightened risk of death as they transit North Africa and cross the Mediterranean. 
Enhanced immigration controls are achieved at the expense of international protection for migrants 
and refugees who are, in effect, bottled-up in North Africa. If migrants succeed in entering Europe 
they find it impossible  to move or leave and their illegal status forces them into a marginal 
existence. 
 
iv. Migrant relationships to the governments in their country of origin 
 
We can now turn to the relation between these migrants and their governments which, according to 
the World Bank, will be critical in view of the unpredictability of official aid in the future (Ratha, 
Mohapatra & Plaza 2008). The draconian policies pursued by Eritrea are directly responsible for the 
refusal of refugees to return and the huge outflow of population after 2000. There is also evidence 
that embassies have refused to assist nationals in Cairo, London and Germany (Thomas 2006;  
Heppner 2007) and that they have demanded the deportation of nationals seeking asylum in Libya, 
South Africa and Israelxxxiii (HRW 2006; Mekonnen & Abraha 2004; Heppner 2003).  
 




In Europe and North America Eritrean embassies control the flow of remittances sent by the 
Diaspora which is worth an estimatedxxxiv $400 million p.a. (Styan 2007). The government has 
imposed compulsory payments on the Diaspora in the form of an annual levy (two percent of 
income) as well as additional payments that are collected by the Party/embassy. Initially the 
Diaspora voluntarily contributed to the EPLF and to the post-war costs of reconstruction and 
development. However these payments are now compulsory and failure to pay has consequences for 
one’s family in Eritrea who may be refused an identity card/passport or visa; be unable to sell or 
transfer property; and they may be refused a permit to rebuild a house or operate a business.  
 
Though it created the Commission for Eritrean’s Living Abroad, there is little evidence that the 
Diaspora is able to voice its concerns to the authorities (indeed the only concrete act, apart from 
consultation on the aborted constitution was to encourage the Diaspora to buy shares in a state 
company).xxxv Instead ‘the government appeared to have no compunction about its demands on the 
Diaspora, viewing them as a ‘lost limb’ that will integrate in host countries and eventually lose 
touch with Eritrea’ (Chatham House 2007: 7). The evidence for this is two-fold. First the 
remittances secured from the Diaspora are used to prop up the current regime in Asmara. External 
funding which is almost completely dependent on Eritrean remittances is used to under right 
national debt and  growing deficit spending (ADB 2003; Eritrea 2005). Second, Eritrean embassies 
have broken up public meetings, quashed dissent against the Government and destroyed refugee 
community organizations in Europe and the US.xxxvi  
 
I am forced to conclude that without a radical change of government the situation for the Diaspora 
and the economy of the country will deteriorate. Members of the Diaspora cannot safely return 
home, and the money they are compelled to give the Government is not being used to invest in 
development. Indeed the failure of Eritrea to lobby on behalf of its Diaspora ensures that their 
illegal status will not change. 
 
Ethiopia appears to be following a different path. It is certainly true that Ethiopian embassies pursue 
the policies of a government which has an extremely bad human rights record which includes 
depriving tens of thousands ethnic Eritrean’s of their citizenship during and after the border war. 
The authorities also harass Ethiopian refugees in Kenya, South Africa, Djibouti and Cairo (HRW 
2002; Brown et al 2004: 674).  
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However in recent years the government has begun to woo it’s sizeable Diaspora by introducing 
policies intended to secure investment. This began by creating the Office of Ethiopian Expatriate 
Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Terrazas 2007: 11). Recent legislation has sought to 
‘safeguard the rights and privileges of Ethiopians abroad’ by allowing them to return home to work 
and own property without have to relinquish the nationality of their country of exile. The reasons 
for this move are not difficult to fathom though it is unclear whether the Government has 
considered the long term implication of opening up the economy to external investment. As stated 
at a recent meeting in Addis Ababa to promote Diaspora investment (Yau & Assefa 2007: 1): 
 
The International Monetary Fund reckons that the Ethiopian Diaspora sent back USD 800 
million in 2005. This roughly doubles if money flowing from unofficial channels is 
accounted for, which means simple wired (or mailed) cash alone equals around 10 – 20% of 
Ethiopia’s USD 13 billion GDP. If we conservatively assume that the diaspora send no more 
than a tenth of their total income home, it is not hard to see that the “GNP” from Ethiopians 
abroad is at least as large as the one inside the country’s border. 
 
This does not count other, perhaps more valuable, “soft” assets. An International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) report estimated that Ethiopia lost 75% of its human 
capital – including a third of doctors – from emigration between 1980 and 1991. The loss in 
business management and other technical skills are likely to be at least as severe.  
 
 Efforts have focused on encouraging professionals to return, securing investment in urban real 
estate and encouraging investment in small-scale enterprises (in a context in which nearly all 
property is state owned and the economy is state run).   
 
The Ethiopian Diaspora in Europe and North America is large and well organized, though primarily 
on ethnic lines. In recent years – particularly in relation to 2005 elections – substantial financial 
support is provided to ethnic-based political parties (who oppose the EPRDF) and to development 
projects (Lyons 2007). It is altogether possible that the ERPDF’s belated recognition of the 
developmental role of the Diaspora derives from its desire to sever the links between the Diaspora 
and opposition political parties. It may also be the case that when the full consequences of opening 
up the economy finally dawn on the government, namely that it will loose the sinecures that come 
with a state-run economy, that it will stop short of implementing the measures necessary to secure 
investment by the Diaspora. There certainly remains deep seated opposition to the government and 




its policies within the Diaspora and it is clear that significant economic and political reforms are 




The dichotomy forced v. voluntary migration is clearly too simplistic to capture the complex factors 
that drive migrants out of The Horn of Africa nor does it assist in understanding the factors that 
come into play into play during migrant’s transit through North Africa or the Middle East where 
political persecution and exploitation channel and shape migration flows into Europe.  
 
Yet when all is said and done, the well-being of tens of thousands of migrants from Eritrea and 
Ethiopia is intimately linked to the economic development of their country of origin and to the 
development of accountable governments at home. On one level the absence of development pushes 
migrants out, however this population exodus is directly linked to the autocratic politics of their 
governments at home and towards the Diaspora abroad which prevents them from returning – 
regardless of EU policies – reinforces their status as illegal’s in Europe, and hinders their ability to 
earn and remit money home. The European Union cannot hope to stem immigration by repressive 
measures, instead it must actively engage with the governments from which migrants flee to assist 
development and to ensure the establishment of accountable governments in migrants country of 
origin which respect human rights and which implement sound economic policies that make good 
use of Diaspora remittances (particularly as official flows of foreign aid decline). 
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Appendix I: Distribution of Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees in Eastern Africa 
(Source: USCRI annual reports at: http://www.refugees.org/home.aspx) 
 
 
Ethiopian Refugees by year and country of residence: 
 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Kenya  5,000 5,000 5,000 20,000 8,000 5,000 
Djibouti 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 
Sudan 50,000 40,000 30,000 30,000 25,000 2,000 
Yemen -- 1,000 3,000 1,000 1,000 1.000 
 
 
2002 2003 2005 2006 
Kenya 10,000 n/a 27,500 31,600 
Djibouti 2,000 1,000 n/a n/a 
Sudan 2,000 1,000 14,900 n/a 




Eritrean refugees by year and country of residence: 
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1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Kenya  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Yemen 2,500 2,000 2,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 
Sudan 340,000 320,000 320,000 350,000 320,000 300,000 
Ethiopia  
 3,000 n/a 4,000 
 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Kenya n/a n/a n/a 3,200 3,200 
Yemen 1,000 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Sudan 280,000 n/a n/a 196,000 230,000 
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